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Election Law and Civil Discourse:  
The Promise of ADR 
JOSHUA A. DOUGLAS*
On Jan. 8, 2011, a seemingly deranged man opened fire at a “Congress 
on Your Corner” event featuring Representative Gabrielle Giffords in 
Tucson, Arizona.1 In the wake of this tragedy, the country questioned 
whether the extreme partisan discourse of recent memory had, in some way, 
contributed to the unfortunate incident.2 President Obama delivered a much-
heralded speech in which he encouraged the country to bridge its differences 
and tame our public discourse:  
[A]t a time when our discourse has become so sharply polarized—at a time 
when we are far too eager to lay the blame for all that ails the world at the 
feet of those who happen to think differently than we do—it’s important for 
us to pause for a moment and make sure that we’re talking with each other 
in a way that heals, not in a way that wounds.3
A few weeks later, the President echoed this sentiment in his State of the 
Union address: “Amid all the noise and passion and rancor of our public 
debate, Tucson reminded us that no matter who we are or where we come 
from, each of us is a part of something greater—something more 
consequential than party or political preference.”4 Although the State of the 
Union has become extremely partisan recently—to the point where 
Republican Congressman Joe Wilson heckled President Obama in 2009 by 
                                                                                                                                         
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. Special 
thanks to the participants and commentators at the Ohio State Journal on Dispute 
Resolution Symposium for invaluable insights on this topic. I also appreciated comments 
I received about earlier drafts of this article from Howard Bellman, Lynn Fraser, and 
Michael Solimine. Thanks also to Colin Bruckel, Matt Hassen, and Kyle Hermanson for 
excellent research assistance. 
1 Marc Lacey & David M. Herszenhorn, Congresswoman is Shot in Rampage Near 
Tucson, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at A1.  
2 Nathan Thornburgh, Violent Rhetoric and Arizona Politics, TIME (Jan. 8, 2011), 
www.time.com/time/nation/article/0.8599.2041408.00.html. 
3 Barack Obama, President, U.S., Remarks by the President for the Victims of the 
Shooting in Tucson, Arizona, Jan. 12, 2011, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/01/12/remarks-president-barack-obama-memorial-service-victims-
shooting-tucson.  
4 Barack Obama, President, U.S., Remarks by the President in State of Union 
Address, Jan. 25, 2011, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address.
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yelling “You lie!” in the middle of his speech and Supreme Court Justice 
Samuel Alito visibly mouthed “not true” in response to the President’s 
statements the following year5—the 2011 State of the Union took on a muted 
tone. Instead of sitting with their partisan brethren, many members of 
Congress sat next to a political opponent in an effort to symbolize the spirit 
of working together.6 The strategy seemed to work: observers noted the 
subdued tone of the applause and “warmer” feeling among the legislators.7
Shortly after this show of national bipartisanship, the Illinois Supreme 
Court issued a high-profile decision regarding whether Rahm Emanuel, 
President Obama’s former Chief of Staff, was eligible for the Chicago 
mayoral ballot.8 Aside from the legal analysis, one aspect of the decision 
stood out: the extremely rancorous language the court used in chastising the 
lower court’s opinion.9 The court, echoing Emanuel’s petition for review, 
scolded the appellate court for its “mysterious” analysis in making up a 
“previously unheard-of test” that the lower court failed to explain.10 The 
language of the high court’s decision was so pointed that two justices 
specially concurred largely to distance themselves from the majority’s tone 
toward the lower appellate court.11
The contrast of these two events—the national call to unity after a 
terrible tragedy and the overt negative tone of the Emanuel decision shortly 
thereafter—is stark. They demonstrate a disturbing trend: national political 
discourse is already caustic, and courts can exacerbate this underlying 
political animosity by including biting negative language when deciding 
election law cases. 
This Symposium explored the potential promises of alternative dispute 
resolution (“ADR”) for resolving election law disputes. Both election law 
and ADR scholars opined on how ADR can help to achieve various goals for 
deciding contentious election law cases. My focus in this essay is narrower: I 
suggest that employing some features of ADR to resolve election disputes 
can help to improve the civil discourse of our elections and our political 
culture. That is, certain aspects of ADR can assist in reducing caustic 
                                                                                                                                         
5 Kathleen B. Hennessey, State of the Union: Lawmakers Strike a More Civil Note,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2011, at A19. 
6 Jennifer Steinhauer & Carl Hulse, For One Night, Lawmakers Forgo Seating by 
Party Affiliation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2011, at A15. 
7 Hennessey, supra note 5.
8 Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm’r of the City of Chi., 950 N.E.2d 1051 (Ill. 
2011). 
9 See infra text accompanying notes 19–27.  
10 Maksym, 950 N.E.2d at 1063.
11 Id. at 1066.
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language in election law judicial decisions, in the media’s reporting of 
election disputes, and among the public overall.  
In previous work, I have identified six goals we should seek to achieve in 
creating mechanisms for resolving election law issues: timeliness, accuracy, 
legitimacy, minimization of ideology, preservation of proper judicial roles 
(judicial economy), and signaling.12 This essay advances a seventh goal: 
greater civility in election law decisions. ADR techniques—with their 
foundation in cooperation and collaboration—provide one path to achieving 
that end. 
Part I reviews the way in which courts both reflect and contribute to 
charged discourse when rendering election law decisions. I examine 
examples from recent election law cases to show that courts are not immune 
from—and may even contribute to—the acerbic political climate of our 
culture. Part II examines ADR’s general framework, discussing how ADR 
leads to better relations between parties as they work together to fashion a 
reasonable solution. Part III suggests that incorporating concepts from ADR 
into the election law world can help to reduce negative court language and 
therefore improve political discourse. 
I. DISCOURSE IN ELECTION LAW JUDICIAL OPINIONS
Election law cases are unique in that they require courts to decide 
inherently political issues.13 Unlike a run-of-the-mill tort or contract case, 
election law disputes ask the judiciary to make rules that shape political 
power and the structure of democracy.14 Although there are certainly other 
                                                                                                                                         
12 See Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 2011 
UTAH L. REV. 433 (2011). 
13 See Edward B. Foley, The Analysis and Mitigation of Electoral Errors: Theory, 
Practice, Policy, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 350, 376–77 (2007) (“Elections, of course, 
are inherently political enterprises. Their appropriately competitive nature intensifies the 
partisanship of the political battles they generate.”); cf. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue 
Burdens on Voter Participation: New Pressures for a Structural Theory of the Right to 
Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 650 (2008) (explaining that “it seems fair to expect 
that the mass public’s perception of courts as above politics will gradually erode if highly 
partisan election-law issues become a recurring part of the judicial docket and judges 
consistently take ‘their’ respective party’s side in answering the question presented.”). 
14 See Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics—The 
Supreme Court, 2003 Term, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 42 (2004) (“Democratic systems are 
typically justified by their ability to realize a variety of aims: to secure political stability; 
to express the equal moral status of all citizens; to ensure that the exercise of coercive 
political power is accountable through elections that select and reject those who hold 
power; to enhance (some would say maximize) the welfare of citizens by making policies 
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areas of the law that present ideological issues and lead judges to use harsh 
language,15 election law decisions are prone to exhibit partisan rhetoric 
precisely because of the nature of the issues involved. They are therefore 
uniquely positioned to contribute to overall negative civic discourse. 
A brief review of recent election law judicial opinions bears this out. The 
decision involving whether Rahm Emanuel, President Obama’s former Chief 
of Staff, met the residency requirements for the Chicago mayoral ballot is a 
prime example. The Chicago Board of Elections and the trial court both ruled 
that Emanuel had not rescinded his Chicago residency when he moved to 
Washington, D.C. to serve the President.16 The appellate court reversed, 2-1, 
with the dissent offering a scathing critique of the majority’s analysis,17
chastising the appellate majority for exhibiting a “careless disregard for the 
law” and stating that the result was a “figment of the majority’s imagination” 
based on the “whims of two judges.”18
The Illinois Supreme Court, in reversing and holding that Emanuel could 
appear on the ballot, followed the dissent’s negative tone. Some poignant 
examples include: 
? “[U]ntil just a few days ago [when the appellate court issued 
its decision], the governing law on this question had been settled in 
this State for going on 150 years.”19
? “The appellate court left it to the reader to discern . . .” the 
distinction it made in its analysis,20 and “the court never explained 
what it meant by these terms.”21
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
responsive to their interests; to enable sound decisionmaking through the generation of 
necessary information; and to unleash individual energy in other spheres as a result of the 
sense of efficacy that participation in self-government generates.”) (citation omitted). 
15 See, e.g., Stephen A. Newman, Political Advocacy on the Supreme Court: The 
Damaging Rhetoric of Antonin Scalia, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 907, 908 (2006–07) 
(“Written opinions of the Supreme Court in important constitutional cases influence not 
only the direction of the law, but the mood and tone of the nation’s politics. … In this 
sense, the rhetoric of the justices inevitably becomes politicized, that is, mixed into the 
brew of policy, law, partisan debate, statesmanship, and occasionally, leadership, that 
constitutes our political life … .”). 
16 Maksym, 950 N.E.2d at 1066. 
17 See Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm’r of the City of Chi., 942 N.E.2d 739, 757–
58 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
18 Id. at 758.
19 Maksym, 950 N.E.2d at 1058.
20 Id. at 1055 n.1.
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? The appellate court “announced that it was no longer bound 
by any of the law cited above, including this court’s decision in [a 
prior analogous case], but was instead free to craft its own original 
standard for determining a candidate’s residency.”22
? “How, exactly, [the appellate court’s analysis] fosters 
consistency and harmony is unclear, and the appellate court makes 
no effort to explain.”23
? The court’s analysis was “somewhat mysterious.”24
? “[T]he court made no attempt to explain what its standard 
means.”25
? “[T]he entire appellate court opinion can be read as nothing 
more than an extended exercise in question begging … .”26
? The Illinois Supreme Court was required to make “an 
assessment of whether the appellate court was justified in tossing out 
150 years of settled residency law in favor of its own preferred 
standard. We emphatically hold that it was not.”27
This is pretty stark language. The Illinois Supreme Court could have 
simply stated that the appellate court was incorrect and pointed out the ways 
in which the lower court’s analysis was flawed. Instead, the court engaged in 
what amounted to judicial name-calling and mud-slinging, construing the 
lower court’s opinion as “mysterious” and ultimately suggesting that the 
court was purposefully flouting clear precedent to decide the case how it 
wanted.28
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
21 Id. at 1056.
22 Id. at 1058.
23 Id. at 1062.
24 Id. at 1063.
25 Maksym, 950 N.E.2d at 1063.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1058.
28 Id. at 1063.
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Indeed, two justices specially concurred largely because they did not 
want to join an opinion with the majority’s “unfortunate” tone.29 These 
justices also criticized the dissenting opinion below for its “inflammatory 
statements.”30 Noting that the media had repeated these sentiments, the 
concurring justices proclaimed that “[i]nflammatory accusations serve only 
to damage the integrity of the judiciary and lessen the trust which the public 
places in judicial opinions.”31
This kind of language is not isolated among election law decisions. 
Election law judicial opinions often include scathing remarks between the 
judges that are unnecessary and unproductive. Perhaps judges are unable to 
help themselves when issuing an opinion that is inherently partisan because 
the decision ultimately determines (or at least significantly impacts) an 
election. Consider Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bush v. Gore:
What must underlie petitioners’ entire federal assault on the Florida election 
procedures is an unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality and capacity 
of the state judges who would make the critical decisions if the vote count 
were to proceed. Otherwise, their position is wholly without merit. The 
endorsement of that position by the majority of this Court can only lend 
credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the 
land. It is confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial 
system that is the true backbone of the rule of law. Time will one day heal 
the wound to that confidence that will be inflicted by today’s decision. One 
thing, however, is certain. Although we may never know with complete 
certainty the identity of the winner of this year’s Presidential election, the 
identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation’s confidence in the 
judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.32
Justice Stevens no doubt used this rhetorical flourish to make a point: he 
believed that the majority’s decision was based on a mistrust of the judiciary 
that he felt was misguided. But in issuing this statement, and in using this 
kind of language, he contributed to the preexisting corrosive political 
atmosphere surrounding the disputed presidential election by suggesting that 
partisanship drove the majority’s resolution of the case. 
These tactics are by no means confined to cases that decide contested 
elections or to liberal or conservative judges. For example, Chief Justice 
Roberts, when discussing whether an elected judge must recuse himself or 
                                                                                                                                         
29 Id. at 1067 (Freeman and Burke, JJ., specially concurring).
30 Id.
31 Maksym, 950 N.E.2d at 1068.
32 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128–29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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herself in a case involving that judge’s donors, criticized the majority’s 
opinion requiring recusal as “so much whistling past the graveyard. . . . The 
déjà vu is enough to make one swoon. . . . [The Court’s decision] will . . . 
bring our judicial system into undeserved disrepute, and diminish the 
confidence of the American people in the fairness and integrity of their 
courts.”33
Similarly, Justice Stevens, in the recent major campaign finance case 
Citizens United, chastised the majority’s opinion for being “backwards” and 
representing a “rejection of the common sense of the American people.”34
Chief Justice Roberts responded that the dissent’s approach was “quite 
perplexing.”35
The public reaction to Citizens United was extremely strong among both 
supporters and opponents of the decision. Those who disagreed with the 
outcome claimed that the Court had opened the door for large corporations to 
run the country;36 those who thought that the Court had ruled correctly were 
effusive in their praise for the opinion as upholding First Amendment rights 
against those who would seek to “ban” speech.37 Even President Obama and 
Justice Alito had a particularly public spat over the consequences of the 
decision during the State of the Union; President Obama claimed that the 
Court’s opinion would allow foreign-owned corporations to influence 
American elections, and in response (and caught on camera), Justice Alito 
mouthed, “not true.”38 Although it is impossible to measure empirically, one 
wonders how much the partisan rhetoric from the Court’s opinion 
contributed to the negative public tone of this debate. The underlying 
principles are hotly contested, but perhaps the Justices’ flippant attitude 
toward each other in their opinions—repeated in the media39—fostered the 
use of this sort of rhetoric among the nation’s leaders and the public at large. 
                                                                                                                                         
33 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2273–74 (2009) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting).
34 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 979 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).
35 Id. at 918 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
36 Editorial, The Court’s Blow to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A30. 
37 Editorial, High Court Ruling Protects Speech, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Jan. 
26, 2010, at A8. 
38 Adam Liptak, A Rare Rebuke, in Front of a Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, at 
A12. 
39 Adam Liptak, Stevens Era, Nearing End, Takes on an Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 
2010, at A12. 
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Most recently, the Supreme Court again engaged in public bickering in a 
campaign finance case. In Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett,40 Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Kagan took pointed shots at each other; there are many 
gems from the opinions one could highlight, but perhaps the most poignant 
was Justice Kagan’s exclamation that although the majority rested its 
analysis on “three smoking guns,” “the only smoke here is the majority’s, 
and it is the kind that goes with mirrors.”41 As Professor Heather Gerken 
proclaimed:
The majority and the dissent bordered on vituperative. Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Kagan write as if they were exasperated with one another. Each 
accuses the other of ignoring facts, ignoring doctrine, even ignoring the 
basic principles undergirding the First Amendment. The two go so far as to 
invoke each other’s rhetorical flourishes ironically, even sarcastically.42
Once again, the media took the Justices’ lead when reporting the 
decision: the New York Times explained how Justice Kagan “dissect[ed] the 
court’s willful misunderstanding of the result,”43 while the Wall Street 
Journal quoted some of Chief Justice Roberts’ more pointed statements and 
proclaimed it a “shame” that the decision was 5–4 and therefore “too close 
for comfort.”44
These examples of negative language in election law opinions are not 
exhaustive. In disputed cases involving election law, judges ratchet up their 
rhetoric. To be sure, this practice is not confined to opinions involving 
                                                                                                                                         
40 Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
41 Id. at 2843 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Other examples from this case include both 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan stating that democracy is not a “game” (and 
thereby implying that the other side thinks it is a game), id. at 2826 (maj. op.), 2846 
(Kagan, J., dissenting); Justice Kagan asserting that the majority failed to take the Court’s 
First Amendment doctrine seriously, id. at 2840; Justice Kagan stating that the Court’s 
response to her points is “difficult to fathom,” id. at 2840; and Justice Kagan’s assertion 
that the majority omitted any reasoning and “virtually ignored” Arizona’s “inescapable 
logic” in passing the law, id. at 2843. 
42 Heather Gerken, Campaign Finance and the Doctrinal Death 
Match, BALKINIZATION, (June 27, 2011), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/06/campaign-
finance-and-doctrinal-death.html. Professor Rick Hasen, in characterizing statements 
from each opinion, used a single word: “ouch!” See Rick Hasen, Ouch!, ELECTION LAW 
BLOG, (June 27, 2011), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19693; Rick Hasen, The Dissent’s 
Ouch!, ELECTION LAW BLOG, (June 27, 2011), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19696.
43 Editorial, The First Amendment, Upside Down, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2011, at 
A22. 
44 Editorial, Another Political Speech Victory, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2011, at A14. 
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election law issues,45 but it is especially concerning in election law because 
litigation is now a routine part of campaign strategy. This means that the 
media will inevitably report on election law judicial decisions as part of its 
campaign coverage, ultimately contributing to and affecting overall public 
discourse.  
Our country is already deeply polarized on many political issues.46 When 
courts decide election law cases, they are either determining the rules of the 
game or the ultimate outcome of an election.47 Thus, court decisions 
contribute to the overall national discussion of who should lead our country. 
When courts render these decisions with an overtly negative tone, they add to 
the preexisting caustic political discourse. The media repeat these sentiments 
when reporting on the decisions.48 Furthermore, the media usually identify 
the presumed political affiliation of the judge deciding the case, lending a 
tenor of perceived partisanship to the decision in the eyes of the public.49
Echoing the negative tone of the decision and casting the case in a partisan 
light leads to the type of unproductive public discourse discussed above, 
especially given that this is often all the public will learn regarding an 
election law decision.  
Indeed, the media has done little to instill confidence in voters. One 
study demonstrated that the media’s coverage of election technology and 
election reform has been decidedly negative, leading to a corresponding 
                                                                                                                                         
45 See, e.g., Newman, supra note 15, at 914–16 (providing examples of Justice 
Scalia’s derisive language in many types of cases). 
46 See MARKUS PRIOR, POST-BROADCAST DEMOCRACY: HOW MEDIA CHOICE 
INCREASES INEQUALITY IN POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND POLARIZES ELECTIONS 214 
(2007) (“In uncommon unison, many academics, journalists, and pundits of all political 
leanings have recently declared that America in the early twenty-first century is more 
politically polarized than it used to be. . . . Observers like to deplore this partisan 
‘warfare’ for its lack of bipartisan spirit and hostility to compromise.”); Richard H. 
Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in 
America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273, 273 (2011) (describing the extreme partisan polarization 
of the past fifty years). 
47 See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189 (2008) 
(allowing states to require voters to show photo identification to vote); see also In re
Contest of General Election Held on Nov. 4, 2008, for Purpose of Electing a U.S. 
Senator, 767 N.W.2d 453, 456 (Minn. 2009) (deciding contested U.S. Senate election in 
Minnesota between Norm Coleman and Al Franken). 
48 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Stevens Era, Nearing End, Takes on an Edge, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 2010, at A12.
49 See Michael E. Solimine, Institutional Process, Agenda Setting, and the 
Development of Election Law on the Supreme Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 767, 789 n.99 
(2007).
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decline in voter confidence.50 Similarly, errors in the projection of a winner 
on election night (recall the 2000 presidential election)—as well as other 
mistakes from the media regarding elections—lead to a less-informed 
electorate, which “potentially influences voter decisionmaking and 
contributes to the election of individuals who are not truly representative of 
the voting constituency.”51 Add the media’s reporting of negative election 
law decisions and it is no wonder that overall public discourse surrounding 
elections has gone downhill. Thus, although courts are not the root cause of 
the negative tone of our politics, they both reflect and embellish it through 
their language in election law opinions. The media repeat this negative tone 
when reporting the decisions, influencing voters’ perceptions of the political 
process and affecting public discourse.  
There are several explanations for the bitter tone of many election law 
cases. One is that courts in general use strong language when they disagree, 
and election law is not unique in reflecting this trend. This might be true, but 
even if election law cases are no different from other cases a court decides in 
terms of the tone of the decisions, they present a unique problem given the 
importance of election law litigation in deciding who will run our political 
institutions, and thus, our country. That is, if elections are the foundation of 
our democracy52—if nothing happens, no laws are passed, and no political 
debate takes place until we elect our leaders—then negative language in 
election law judicial opinions taints the foundation of our political society. 
Because democracy begins at the ballot box, we should be concerned about 
the tenor of court decisions that have an impact on this foundational 
principle. 
A different theory is that the tone of election law cases is particularly 
bitter because judges are repeat players with each other and therefore are 
used to disagreeing on a multitude of cases. When these disagreements 
become political, judges’ entrenched political predilections inherently seep 
out in the form of negative language. Professor Foley explains:  
[judges] are used to disagreeing about abortion, criminal procedure, and a 
whole range of topics, including redistricting, campaign finance, and other 
election-related issues. If faced with a dispute over which candidate won a 
                                                                                                                                         
50 See R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall & Morgan Llewellyn, On American Voter 
Confidence, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 651, 659 (2007).
51 Blake D. Morant, Electoral Integrity: Media, Democracy, and the Value of Self-
Restraint, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1, 22 (2003).
52 See, e.g., Rebecca Murray, Voteauction.net: Protected Political Speech or 
Treason?, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 357, 357 (2005) (“Free and equal elections are a 
fundamental foundation of a healthy democracy.”).
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major statewide race, these routinely polarized judges may simply fall into 
the pattern of disagreeing again in a way that tracks their partisan 
backgrounds.53
By contrast, judges who sit together for the first time to hear a highly-
charged dispute might remain “on their best behavior, judicially speaking,” 
based on “human nature generally, or a specific feature of judicial etiquette” 
so as to “make a good first impression on their colleagues.”54
In addition, litigation breeds distrust. Scholars have demonstrated that 
the Supreme Court has evinced “hostility” toward litigation in the language 
of its opinions, ultimately contributing to negative legal discourse55:
Decisions limiting punitive damages refer to a perception that damages 
awards have “‘run wild’”; decisions disallowing lawsuits against state 
governments portray “a Kafkaesque universe in which the defenseless state 
is ‘hauled’ into Court or ‘thrust’ by ‘fiat’ and ‘against its will’ into 
‘disfavored status’ and ‘subject to the power of private citizens”’ – language 
from Court decisions that . . . pervasively portrays litigation as “mire and 
unseemliness,” not a legitimate method of dispute resolution.56
Professor Siegel explains that, in the wake of Bush v. Gore, some 
scholars have viewed the Rehnquist era as marked by “an aggressiveness of 
both tone and substance that, depending on one’s perspective, might be 
characterized as either presumptuousness or bravery.”57 On top of this, 
Professor Siegel adds that the Rehnquist Court expressed a profound 
“hostility towards the institution of litigation and [a] concomitant skepticism 
as to the ability of litigation to function as a mechanism for organizing social 
relations and collectively administering justice.”58 This hostility toward 
litigation comes through in the Court’s language, which sends negative 
                                                                                                                                         
53 Edward B. Foley, The McCain v. Obama Simulation: A Fair Tribunal for 
Disputed Presidential Elections, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 471, 505 (2010).
54 Id. Professor Foley made these observations in the context of a simulation of an 
election law dispute that involved a specially-created three-judge panel.
55 Andrew Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an 
Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1108
(2006).
56 Scott Moss, Fighting Discrimination While Fighting Litigation: A Tale of Two 
Supreme Courts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 1003 (2007) (citing Siegel, supra note 55).
57 Siegel, supra note 55, at 1104.
58 Id. at 1108.
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signals about the role of the judiciary in resolving disputes.59 In election law, 
this sentiment contributes to the already hostile environment these cases 
encompass. 
Another explanation for negative discourse in these cases is that judges 
are inherently political, and it is impossible for them not to revert to their 
partisan leanings when deciding a case about political power. This pervades 
the language they use. People are passionate and employ heated rhetoric 
when debating politics, and judges are no different.60 For example, Supreme 
Court campaign finance cases have been particularly heated recently, and it 
may be because the Justices recognize: 
this is a doctrinal death match between two incompatible world views. The 
justices in these cases cannot agree on the basic premises undergirding 
campaign finance doctrine. . . . The justices know it’s a fight to the finish, 
and they are writing their opinions accordingly. The stakes are high, and so 
is the rhetoric.61
That is, judges use partisan and negative language in cases involving 
ideological issues because they are human and must decide winners and 
losers in a case that allocates political power.62 The sharper the ideological 
divide and lack of common ground, the greater the rhetoric. 
Partisanship and rancor among judges is particularly acute for elected 
state judges, who are required to run in an election to secure and retain their 
positions.63 A federal judge recently lamented the “marked decline in the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s perceived ability to function collegially,” which 
has coincided with the “explosion” of campaign expenditures for Wisconsin 
                                                                                                                                         
59 Id. at 1114 (explaining that the Rehnquist Court exhibited “attitudinal orientation 
against litigation, an instinctive skepticism that is triggered whenever the proposed 
disposition of a case requires the extensive, aggressive, or creative use of the courts or the 
judicial power”).
60 See Solimine, supra note 49, at 789 n.99 (explaining that the public often assumes 
that federal judges vote in partisan ways in election law cases).
61 Heather Gerken, No Middle Ground, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/27/the-court-and-the-future-of-public-
financing/no-middle-ground-on-campaign-finance-law.
62 See generally Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2008) (finding that judges in Voting Rights Act cases tend to vote 
in partisan ways).
63 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address: State Judicial Independence—A 
National Concern, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 559, 564–65 (2010) (“Ask yourselves whether, 
as a litigant, you would want to be standing in front of a judge who faced an upcoming 
election if your cause was legally right but politically unpopular.”).
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Supreme Court elections.64 This lack of collegiality and “unseemly public 
disputes” have “severely harmed the reputation of [the] court.”65 Thus, for 
elected judges, the devolvement of political discourse is also traceable to the 
method by which they obtain their seats. 
Ultimately, courts are not the cause of the extreme partisanship of our 
country, but they are not helping either. Although negative discourse is not 
limited to election law cases, it poses a problem in election law precisely 
because this is the area in which the public is most likely to exhibit 
ideological divisions. Caustic language in court decisions is thus a factor that 
contributes to our increasingly partisan society. When courts decide election 
law cases and snipe at each other or are otherwise not collegial, they 
contribute to the already negative tone of our political discourse. Assuming, 
as a normative matter, that we want to reduce partisan rhetoric in our 
elections, then we should think about how courts contribute to this problem 
and what alternatives we might employ to avoid negative discourse when 
resolving election law disputes. 
II. ADR’S COLLABORATIVE APPROACH
Alternative dispute resolution starts with a fundamentally different 
premise than litigation: cooperation and collaboration are possible while 
resolving a dispute. “The principles behind Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR), such as value creating as opposed to value claiming, are illustrative 
of a humanistic approach to legal problems. The principles of ADR [involve] 
cooperation, compromise, and continuance.”66 ADR is thought to be 
mutually beneficial to all involved: “ADR will often connote notions of 
something better than the traditional litigation process: more accessible and 
understandable to the layperson, less adversarial, expensive, and time-
consuming, and more likely to produce an outcome that matches the interests 
of the disputants.”67 Stated differently, “[t]he purpose of dispute systems 
design is to offer the parties maximal choice and assistance in finding the 
best way to resolve their dispute for mutual benefit, if possible, and at the 
                                                                                                                                         
64 Wis. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Brennan, No. 3:09-cv-00764-wmc, 
6 n.3 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 31, 2011).
65 Id.
66 Virginia Brown, Revisiting the Public Policy Exception to the Employment-at-Will 
Doctrine Following Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects: Applying an Ethic of 
Care Analysis, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 295, 311 n.53 (2004).
67 Deborah R. Henslera, A Glass Half Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 
1594 (1995).
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lowest cost in time, money, and relationship.”68 ADR, which incorporates 
concepts of “common sense and flexibility . . . involves the use of a wider 
array of approaches to resolve disputes than the traditional and often more 
costly methods of adversarial litigation and administrative adjudication.”69
ADR is infused with “harmony ideology,” defined as “the belief that 
harmony in the guise of compromise or agreement is ipso facto better than an 
adversary posture.”70 Professor Nader traces the rise of ADR and its notions 
of “harmony” in part to Chief Justice Burger:
The Chief Justice warned that adversarial modes of conflict resolution were 
tearing the country apart, and that there had to be a better way. He claimed 
that Americans were inherently litigious, and that ADR was more civilized 
than the adversary process. His “Isn’t There a Better Way?” speeches 
followed the peremptory style of assertive rhetoric, grounding the use of 
arbitration with reference to the time of Homer and Athenian law. Pointing 
to the early uses of arbitration, he said lawyers should serve as healers, 
rather than warriors, procurers, or hired guns. He also repeated that 
Americans were the most litigious people on the globe. During his time as 
Chief Justice, Burger continued to speak about lawyers as healers, and 
plaintiffs as patients needing treatment; there was little talk of rights, 
remedies, injustice, prevention, or unequal power.71
For example, Chief Justice Burger explained that “[a] common thread 
pervades all courtroom contests: lawyers are natural competitors, and once 
litigation begins they strive mightily to win using every tactic available.”72
He issued a call to action to: 
use the inventiveness, the ingenuity, and the resourcefulness that have long 
characterized the American business and legal community to shape new 
tools73 [in such a way that] can produce an acceptable result in the shortest 
                                                                                                                                         
68 William L. Ury, Foreword to CATHY A. CONSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES 
MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ix (1996).
69 CATHY A. CONSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 33 (1996).
70 Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and 
Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 1, 3 (1993).
71 Id. at 6.
72 Warren Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way? Remarks at the Mid-Year Meeting of 
the American Bar Association (Jan. 24, 1982), in 68 A.B.A. 274, 275 (1982).
73 Id. at 276.
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possible time, with the least possible expense, and with a minimum of stress 
on the participants. That is what justice is all about.74
Thus, one perceived advantage of ADR processes is that they are “more 
satisfying and more private, produce better outcomes, and contribute to a 
more civil society through less contentious methods of dispute resolution.”75
Creation of a non-litigation dispute system in various contexts leads to “(1) 
less lost time and money to resolve a conflict, (2) fewer missed commercial 
opportunities, and (3) fewer outbreaks of violence and decreased resort to 
power struggles.”76 Meanwhile, alternative dispute systems “can enhance 
communication and increase party satisfaction with the process and result.”77
The three main pillars of alternative dispute resolution are arbitration, 
mediation, and negotiation.78 Although each have different approaches, they 
share an underlying premise of compromise between the parties.79 One of the 
reasons that people agree to use alternative dispute resolution is that they 
know they will be interacting with the opposing side in ongoing 
relationships, and thus there is an incentive to work together in a spirit of 
collaboration. As one commentator explains, “arbitrators [in the 
entertainment industry] understand that the parties often have ongoing 
relationships and they can maintain an atmosphere conducive to continuing 
positive working relationships.”80 Similarly, practitioners recognize that 
“[a]rbitration can lead to positive results for the resolution of business 
disputes, including less adversarial relationships, faster decisions, and lower 
dispute resolution costs.”81 In fact, lawyers routinely state that they prefer 
                                                                                                                                         
74 Id. at 274.
75 Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justices, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 963 (2000).
76 Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems 
Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 179 (2007).
77 Id.
78 See Stephen J. Ware & Sarah Rudolph Cole, Introduction: ADR in Cyberspace,
15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 589, 590 (2000) (“Three processes of dispute resolution—
arbitration, negotiation, and mediation—are the Big Three of alternative dispute 
resolution.”).
79 See Kirk W. Schuler, Note, ADR’s Biggest Compromise, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 751, 
754 (2006) (“ADR is essentially a compromise.”).
80 Linda Bartlett, Lights, Camera, Action! Arbitration in the Entertainment Industry,
61 DISP. RESOL. J. 48 (Nov. 2006-Jan. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).
81 Scott D. Marrs & Sean P. Milligan, What You Always Wanted To Know About 
Arbitration: Five Arbitration Issues Recently Decided By The Courts, 73 TEX. B. J. 634, 
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invoking ADR to resolve lawsuits, and those who use ADR methods 
overwhelmingly respond that they would like to employ the procedures 
again.82 Similarly, one study demonstrated that attorneys involved in a 
summary jury trial procedure believed that it “has great potential for 
enhancing communications between attorneys and their clients over 
acceptable settlement offers,” particularly when the parties enter the process 
with a cooperative spirit.83
Certainly, as one moves along the spectrum of ADR, the underlying 
premise of cooperation changes. Negotiation is the most collaborative of the 
alternative dispute resolution systems, as the parties try to compromise by 
themselves to reach an agreement.84 Mediation is still cooperative, but the 
parties use a third party to facilitate negotiations without giving that third 
party any power to decide the dispute.85 Arbitration is the most adversarial, 
as the parties present their positions to a third party who will resolve the 
case.86 All three of these dispute resolution techniques are less adversarial 
than traditional litigation.87
ADR processes achieve greater cooperation and collaboration through 
several techniques. Negotiation and mediation are highly collaborative 
because the parties work together to reach an amicable resolution. 
“Mediation can be a viable dispute resolution technique because mediation is 
viewed as conciliatory while litigation is viewed as adversarial.”88 As one 
scholar explains, 
                                                                                                                                         
82 See Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal 
Courts, 76 IOWA L. REV. 889, 894 n.26 (1991) (citing various statistics that show that 70–
90% of attorneys surveyed responded favorably to ADR processes). 
83 James J. Alfini, Summary Jury Trials in State and Federal Courts: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Perceptions of Participating Lawyers, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 213, 
218 (1989).
84 Id. (“Negotiation . . . is the most collaborative form of dispute resolution.”).
85 See William F. Heinzea, Patent Mediation: The Forgotten Alternative in Dispute 
Resolution, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 333, 341 (1991) (“The goal of mediation is to help the parties 
decide for themselves.”).
86 See Bryant G. Garth, Challenging the ‘Eternal Nature’ of Global ADR, 15 
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 1, 2 (1997) (“[s]tudents and practitioners of 
alternative dispute resolution quite naturally emphasize the distinctions among litigation, 
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87 See Schuler, supra note 79, at 754.
88 Michael Fitzgerald & Lynne M.L. Fitzgerald, Mediation: A Systemic Alternative 
to Litigation for Resolution of Church Employment Disputes, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 507, 
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Mediation is not merely an alternative, nor a private process . . . , but a 
discourse that carries legal meaning and which can be used to enforce and 
implement the Rule of Law, encompassing its highest values. Mediation 
represents the extreme “alternative” to adjudication, and thus can be used as 
the paradigm of dispute resolution emphasis in law.89
With respect to arbitration, the parties enjoy flexibility in designing a 
procedure that works best for their dispute.90 With this flexibility comes 
greater autonomy, allowing parties to feel that they have a say in how the 
process is run and a stake in the procedure employed. 91 Indeed, that is one of 
the basic points of ADR.92 ADR thus seeks to “transcend the adversarial 
model, although the ADR field encompasses adjudicative and adversarial 
processes as well.”93
To be sure, criticism of ADR abounds.94 Systems of alternative dispute 
resolution may have downfalls: they can be coercive,95 lead to less just 
results,96 are ineffective as case management tools,97 minimize the 
                                                                                                                                         
89 Michal Albertstein, Forms of Mediation and Law: Cultures of Dispute Resolution,
22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 321, 322 (2007).
90 John Arrastia Jr. & Christi L. Underwood, Arbitration v. Litigation: You Control 
The Process v. The Process Controls You, 64 DISP. RESOL. J. 31, 32 (November 2009-
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agreement to arbitrate is to achieve ‘streamlined proceedings and expeditious results.”’ 
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 
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92 See, e.g., Susanna S. Fodor & Steven C. Bennett, Arbitrating Commercial Real 
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93 Albertstein, supra note 89, at 322.
94 See, e.g., Nader, supra note 70, at 7–10.
95 See id. at 12–13.
96 See id.
97 See Dayton, supra note 82, at 951.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION  [Vol. 27:2 2012]?
308
importance of vindicating legal rights,98 and reinforce preexisting imbalances 
between the parties.99 I am not suggesting in this essay that ADR is the best 
mechanism to resolve all election law cases: plenty of ink already has been 
spilled regarding whether ADR is good or bad for our system of civil 
justice.100 Nor am I arguing that it is even possible for ADR to resolve every 
election law dispute as a practical matter. Instead, I seek to contrast the lack 
of civility in many election law court decisions with ADR’s cooperative 
foundation. Perhaps, if we think about election law issues in the spirit of 
ADR’s collaborative approach, we can at least temper the overly negative 
rhetoric of election law court decisions and the media’s reporting of them. 
That is, using ADR techniques for some election law issues might help to 
infuse election debate with ADR’s more cooperative framework. 
III. ADOPTING FEATURES OF ADR FOR ELECTION LAW CASES
In Part I, I demonstrated how election law judicial opinions often include 
highly caustic language, which, when repeated in the media, can contribute 
to our overall negative public discourse. In Part II, I explained how systems 
of alternative dispute resolution start with a foundation of cooperation and 
are less adversarial than traditional litigation. This part marries these 
concepts, discussing how, by using the collaborative spirit underlying ADR, 
we can resolve election law challenges in a less adversarial manner. My goal 
is not to advocate for the use of ADR in all election law cases.101 Instead, I 
hope to encourage election litigants to think about how they can resolve their 
disputes with greater civility. Indeed, candidates themselves have an 
incentive to work amicably with their opponents given that they likely will 
be repeat players with each other, either in future campaigns or while 
governing. If they can incorporate concepts of ADR into their challenges—
by, for example, looking for common ground before going to court—they 
can demonstrate how election law need not be a completely adversarial area 
                                                                                                                                         
98 See Lauren B. Edelman, Howard S. Erlanger & John Lande, Internal Dispute 
Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
497, 503–04 (1993).
99 See, e.g., Reuben, supra note 75, at 963.
100 See supra notes 66–77.
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of the law. When disputes do reach court, the parties will be used to working 
together at trying to reach a resolution, which can result in an overall 
cooperative spirit. Perhaps courts will take notice and use less negative 
language when resolving the issues, giving the media less fodder for stirring 
up controversy. This, in turn, will improve our public discourse surrounding 
elections. There is also a role for courts to play, both in channeling election 
law disputes to ADR-type processes and in taking care to exhibit greater 
civility in their written decisions. 
How can election litigants proceed with the spirit of ADR when they 
have a dispute? My general prescription is that parties to an election law 
contest should attempt to reach agreement on minor issues as soon as they 
arise, either through private negotiation or more formalized settlement 
procedures. Additionally, parties should seek to cooperate in crafting ground 
rules for the campaign. Certainly, some election disputes present issues in 
which there is no possibility of compromise: in a post-election contest 
regarding the winner of an election, for example, it is hard to fathom a 
compromise solution because only one candidate can take office.102 But there 
are tons of micro-level disputes that arise throughout the course of an 
election that ADR can handle. ADR concepts can lead to a less-costly 
resolution of certain issues without each side having to call in expensive 
“hired gun” lawyers.103 Moreover, by resolving these disputes through ADR, 
the parties will be used to working together and hopefully will approach a 
court in a more collaborative manner when they need to resort to litigation. 
Finally, the parties should collaborate ahead of time to agree on a particular 
process for resolving disputes; “collective participation in creating conflict 
management processes increases the likelihood that the resulting processes 
will be used and preferred.”104 In this way, invoking ADR will allow election 
litigants to achieve flexibility and “tailor the process to the problem.”105
One benefit of invoking ADR for election law disputes is that it can help 
to avoid litigation altogether and thus eliminate the problem of judges using 
negative language in their decisions. Another virtue is that it will give the 
media less fodder for exploiting perceived controversies between the parties. 
That is, caustic language from a judge legitimizes the media’s reporting of 
disputes between the candidates. Bitter court decisions give the media 
                                                                                                                                         
102 But see I. Glenn Cohen, Negotiating Death: ADR and End of Life Decision-
Making, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 253, 283–84 (2004) (advocating for the use of ADR in 
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stronger footing to focus on the “horse race” aspects of the campaign. By 
channeling disputes to ADR, the media has less ability to rest on “official” 
negative statements from a court about the dispute, which in turn will 
hopefully improve the tone of news reporting or at least make negative 
stories less legitimate in the public’s eye. This should have a corollary 
positive effect on overall civic discourse. 
There are several models already in existence for ADR-type resolution of 
certain election law controversies.106 Indeed, a handful of states direct 
disputes under their Help America Vote Act (HAVA) provisions to some 
form of alternative dispute resolution.107 Additionally, the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) has an Alternative Dispute Resolution Program in which 
it employs interest-based negotiation strategies and mediation to resolve 
complaints under the Federal Election Campaign Act and its implementing 
regulations.108 As the website for the program explains, its “interest-based” 
negotiation techniques focus on the parties’ interests instead of positions as 
“a problem-solving process to collaborate on a solution, in the FEC 
compliance context, that is specific and appropriate for both the FEC and for 
the respondent in an administrative complaint or referral.”109
Perhaps the ADR method that has had the greatest success is voluntary 
agreements between candidates regulating certain aspects of their 
campaigns.110 In these arrangements, the candidates bargain to determine the 
parameters of their election practices.111 For example, elections have 
involved voluntary campaign finance agreements under which the candidates 
agree to certain restrictions, such as banning soft money expenditures by 
political parties and other interest groups.112 Hillary Rodham Clinton and 
Rick Lazio agreed to this sort of arrangement for their 2000 U.S. Senate race 
in New York, and both sides largely complied with the compact.113
                                                                                                                                         
106 Constantino and Merchant identify six broad categories of ADR procedures: 
preventive, negotiated, facilitated, fact-finding, advisory, and imposed. See generally id.
at 37–41 (discussing the dynamics of each method).
107 See Butcher-Lyden, supra note 101, at Appendix VI.
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Similarly, Elizabeth Warren and Scott Brown are trying a negotiated 
agreement limiting outside spending in their 2012 U.S. Senate race in 
Massachusetts.114 Voluntary agreements are beneficial because the parties 
will view them as legitimate, rational, and efficient.115 Assuming the parties 
agree on a nonpartisan third party to handle disputes or infractions, these 
arrangements also eliminate the need to resort to litigation.116 Thus, 
voluntary agreements at the beginning of a campaign demonstrate the 
parties’ interest in cooperating, which can help to ratchet down the extreme 
partisanship that infects the litigation process in election law cases by 
ultimately reducing election-related litigation. 
Parties can also negotiate to ensure a more civil campaign. In the 
Minnesota Compact of 1996, a coalition of academic, civic, business, and 
media groups drafted a voluntary agreement that sought to improve 
campaign discourse.117 The Compact called on candidates to refrain from 
misleading attacks and instead to engage in substantive debates. It also asked 
the media to focus its reporting on substantive issues instead of writing 
“horse race” stories about projected election outcomes.118 Although it is 
impossible to measure empirically, post-election evaluations of the 
agreement suggest that the Minnesota Compact led to more positive public 
discourse surrounding Minnesota elections.119
Overall, voluntary agreements, particularly regarding campaign finance 
limitations, have been successful, albeit infrequently invoked.120 As one 
commentator notes in advocating for the increased use of voluntary 
campaign finance reform, “It is more flexible than legal regulations because 
voluntary agreements can be adapted to the specific circumstances of any 
particular campaign. It treats changed campaigns as an immediate possibility 
                                                                                                                                         
114 See Matt Taylor, Mutually Assured Super PAC Destruction In Massachusetts?,
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rather than a distant goal.”121 A negotiated agreement between candidates 
allows the campaigns to collaborate by setting the ground rules before an 
election becomes too heated, promoting a spirit of cooperation. Assuming 
that the agreement has a mechanism for resolving disputes or reporting 
infractions, it also avoids litigation. This, in turn, can help to temper divisive 
decisionmaking. Moreover, the parties can include the media in the compact 
to help foster positive reporting about the election.  
Another ADR-type strategy for election law that can help to improve 
public discourse is negotiated rulemaking.122 This procedure is an alternative 
to administrative notice-and-comment rulemaking and is analogous to 
mediation.123 A third-party neutral serves as a mediator to help the parties 
create a rule that all will see as beneficial, or at least tolerable given the 
respective trade-offs.124 Negotiated rulemaking is appropriate in situations in 
which the parties will not be able to reach an agreement on their own given 
their varying incentives.125
A virtue of negotiated rulemaking is that there is no immediate threat of 
arbitration or litigation.126 Negotiated rulemaking is inherently cooperative 
between the agency promulgating the rule and the affected parties, leading to 
a mutually beneficial outcome and the hope of “objectively superior” rules 
than what is possible using more “competitive tactics.”127 It also provides 
greater “empowerment” to individual interests than more adversarial 
procedures, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking.128
Highly partisan election law issues could benefit from negotiated 
rulemaking, especially because there are so many stakeholders involved, 
from the candidates themselves to national regulatory bodies to the local 
election officials who must implement a rule.129 For example, one area that is 
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ripe for the use of negotiated rulemaking is voter eligibility.130 Prior to an 
election, the respective interested groups and individuals could, in 
conjunction with the governmental agency that has authority to promulgate 
appropriate rules, use negotiated rulemaking to determine the extent to which 
voters must affirm their identity at the polls. This mechanism allows for 
creative solutions. As one commentator explains in the context of verifying 
the identity and residence of homeless individuals: 
Possible solutions that address voter identification requirements might 
include allowing a person to vote by affirming his identity by affidavit, by 
providing a social security number even if the homeless person does not 
possess his social security card, or by issuing the person a specific voter 
identification card. One possibility for resolving the issue of residency 
includes allowing homeless voters to claim a park bench or alley as their 
home for purposes of districting, and providing them with a post office box 
or other mailing address where they could receive their card and other 
election-related information. . . . More creative options include creating a 
“homeless district” comprised not by geography, but by a citizen’s status of 
not having a traditional residence. Because of the inherently complex 
balance between protecting the rights of the people to express their rights 
and the interest of the state in protecting the integrity of the government, 
there have been calls for creative solutions in other areas of election law. 
This would be no different.131
Negotiated rulemaking allows for flexible solutions to issues and fosters 
consensus-building.132 This spirit of collaboration will likely spill over into 
the campaign itself. Parties who are used to cooperating—even when they 
have adverse interests—necessarily are likely to engage in more positive 
discourse.133 Negotiated rulemaking thus provides an alternative to litigation 
for some election law disputes, which will have the corollary effect of 
improving public discourse surrounding elections. 
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131 Id. at 194–95.
132 See id. at 187. 
133 Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of 
Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1262–63 (1997) (“Intuitively, rules 
developed through a process that seeks the consensus of affected parties at the outset 
would seem less likely to generate subsequent conflict and litigation.”).
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Arbitration of election law issues provides another mechanism to foster 
more positive debate.134 A common practice in arbitration proceedings is to 
have each of the parties select one member of the arbitration panel, with 
those two selecting a third.135 This process provides a structural guarantee 
against bias because both sides can choose an arbitrator that each thinks will 
be most fair to his or her position.136 The parties also can select arbitrators 
who are knowledgeable about the issues.137 Further, arbitration less 
frequently leads to a published opinion138—which can be both good and bad. 
On the one hand, simply declaring the outcome avoids the possibility of 
negative language in the opinion and can eliminate damage to the parties’ 
reputations.139 This in turn minimizes the concern of harmful language 
infusing the campaign. On the other hand, the public loses the benefit of an 
explained decision that can serve as precedent and guide future disputes.140
Nevertheless, if the goal is to enhance civility in election law controversies, 
this may be a tradeoff we are willing to accept for certain types of issues. 
The three strategies discussed above—voluntary agreements, negotiated 
rulemaking, and election-related arbitration—mirror the typical tools of 
ADR: negotiation, mediation, and general arbitration. As noted, I do not 
intend in this essay to advocate the use of these processes for all election law 
disputes. Indeed, “the method of dispute resolution must be appropriate for 
the particular dispute or problem; there must be a fit between the process and 
                                                                                                                                         
134 See Christopher Baum, The Benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution in 
Common Interest Development Disputes, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 907, 925 (2010) (noting 
that “[a]rbitration is . . . less contentious than litigation”).
135 See, e.g., 2007 CPR Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration Rule 5, CENTER FOR 
PUBLIC RESOURCES (last visited Jun. 20, 2011),
http://www.cpradr.org/Resources/ALLCPRArticles/tabid/265/ID/600/2007-CPR-Rules-
for-Non-Administered-Arbitration.aspx. Others also have suggested this three-arbitrator 
panel mechanism for the resolution of election disputes. See, e.g., Butcher-Lyden, supra
note 101, at 550.
136 See Michael J. Molony, Jr., A-mazing! A Due Process Protocol for Mediation 
and Arbitration of Employment Law Disputes, 44 LA. B.J. 126, 128 (1996) (explaining 
that “participation of both parties in the selection of an arbitrator, with the privilege of 
striking unacceptable arbitrators, [provides] a further safeguard that reduces significantly 
any claim of potential bias or unfairness of the arbitrator or arbitration panel”).
137 See Baum, supra note 134, at 928.
138 Id. at 926.
139 Id.
140 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements 
and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
379, 419 (2006) (“The public benefits of judicial resolution [include] published decisions, 
precedent, and reinforcement of public norms.”).
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the problem.”141 But if there is a way to employ ADR techniques 
appropriately to resolve election disputes, then an added benefit is the 
minimization of the negative tone of election law decisionmaking.  
Consider the Rahm Emanuel case regarding his Chicago residency, 
discussed in Part I.142 Suppose that the Emanuel campaign sat down with his 
challengers to try to work out a resolution on whether he was eligible for the 
Chicago mayoral ballot. Obviously, the challengers were trying to kick him 
off of the ballot because they supported one of his opponents.143 But the 
basis of their challenge was that Emanuel had lost his residency by moving to 
Washington.144 The purpose of residency requirements is to ensure that the 
person running for office actually knows the area and his or her prospective 
constituency.145 Therefore, maybe the parties could have agreed that 
Emanuel could satisfy the challengers that he was still a “true” Chicagoan 
and understood the local issues through another mechanism—perhaps by 
agreeing to a debate on specific recent local issues or writing an op-ed on his 
understanding of what had occurred in the city while he was gone. This 
might seem far-fetched if the challengers’ real goal was to ensure Emanuel 
would not be on the ballot. But if we take seriously the underlying legal 
theory and policy behind residency laws—that only those who are truly 
interested in the area and constituency can satisfactorily serve as a 
representative to those people146—then the parties could have created a 
negotiated solution to prove that Emanuel met that requirement. 
                                                                                                                                         
141 Constantino & Merchant, supra note 69, at 41.
142 See supra Part I.
143 Monica Davey, Can You ‘Reside’ in Chicago if You Live Somewhere Else?, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2011), at A3.
144 Id.
145 See S. Chad Meredith, Note, Look Homeward Candidate: Evaluating and
Reforming Kentucky’s Residency Definition and Bona Fides Challenges in Order to 
Avoid a Potential Crisis in Gubernatorial Elections, 95 KY. L.J. 211, 216–17 (2007) 
(“[r]esidency requirements serve the purpose of ensuring that candidates are ‘exposed to 
the problems, needs, and desires of the people whom [they are] to govern, and [the 
requirements] also give[ ] the people . . . a chance to observe [the candidates] and gain 
firsthand knowledge about [their] habits and character.’ In other words, residency 
requirements are intended to be a ‘means of achieving the goal of having knowledgeable 
and qualified people in high public office.’”) (quoting Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 
1211, 1217 (D.N.H. 1973)).
146 See id. at 217; cf. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 70 (1982) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“[t]o be sure, allegiance and attachment may be rationally measured by 
length of residence—length of residence may, for example, be used to test the bona fides 
of citizenship—and allegiance and attachment may bear some rational relationship to a 
very limited number of legitimate state purposes. cf. Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 
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Negotiated rulemaking is probably an even better ADR tool for the 
parties to have used in resolving this dispute, particularly because it could 
have included the relevant regulatory or legislative body that would have the 
authority to interpret or change the statutory requirements for candidate 
eligibility. Emanuel and his challengers could have agreed to a binding 
rulemaking process to update the Illinois residency laws to take account of 
those who leave to serve the President. That rule also could consider both the 
goals behind residency laws and the reality of modern-day travel and 
communications. All interested groups thus could have had a say in whether 
it was appropriate for Emanuel to lose his residency status by going to 
Washington to serve as President Obama’s Chief of Staff. The decision likely 
would be seen as legitimate because it would involve all interested parties in 
promulgating an appropriate rule.147 Most importantly, it would have 
avoided the back-and-forth bickering between different decisionmakers that 
occurred as the case proceeded through the courts.148
Finally, the parties might have agreed to arbitrate their dispute. In the 
realm of ADR, arbitration is most similar to litigation, so perhaps this would 
not have completely avoided the public acrimony over the decision.149 But it 
might have helped. For one, the parties could have chosen the 
decisionmakers, which potentially increases the legitimacy of the decision.150
Additionally, the arbitrators presumably would be knowledgeable in Illinois 
election and residency law, so perhaps they would not have made the same 
mistake the Illinois Appellate Court did. 
Other examples of situations in which ADR can help to resolve disputes 
in a more congenial manner than litigation are abundant. Consider the 2010 
U.S. Senate race in Alaska. After Election Day, Lisa Murkowski and Joe 
Miller vigorously disputed whether write-in votes for Murkowski that had 
minor spelling mistakes counted as valid votes under Alaska law.151 Instead 
of waiting for a post-election court battle, however, the parties could have 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1211, 1217 (D.N.H. 1973), summarily aff’d, 414 U.S. 802 (1973) (7-year citizenship 
requirement to run for governor)”). 
147 See Coglianese, supra note 133, at 1262 (citing Philip J. Harter, Negotiating 
Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 28–31 (1982)).
148 See supra Part I.
149 See, e.g., Editorial, Judicial Arrogance, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 25, 2011, at 14.
150 Olga K. Byrne, Note, A New Code of Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators: The 
Neutrality of Party Appointed Arbitrators on a Tripartite Panel, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1815, 1841 (2003) (“A party-appointed arbitrator renders the decision more acceptable 
because the parties know they have had someone who clearly understands their position 
on the panel.”). 
151 Miller v. Treadwell, 245 P.3d 867, 887–88 (Alaska 2010).
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entered into a pre-election voluntary agreement regarding which types of 
misspellings would or would not count, or they could have gone through 
negotiated rulemaking. Of course, the parties would have needed to invoke 
these techniques quickly to have a clear rule in place before Election Day, 
and the standard would have to be consistent with Alaska election law. But 
having a rule ahead of time—which both parties would have contributed to 
promulgating—could have avoided the acrimonious post-election 
litigation.152
Even Citizens United, probably the most contentious Supreme Court case 
since Bush v. Gore, might have benefited from ADR techniques.153 The 
challengers in that case asserted that the independent expenditure limitation 
in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act did not apply to their 
communication, which was a video-on-demand feature-length movie 
produced by a nonprofit corporation that received only part of its funds from 
for-profit corporations.154 As the dissent noted, there were several as-applied 
mechanisms that could have exempted the plaintiffs from the reach of the 
law.155 Instead of a polarizing Supreme Court decision, then, the parties 
could have engaged in a form of negotiated rulemaking or interest-based 
negotiation through the Federal Election Commission to determine whether 
the law actually should apply to this kind of electioneering communication. 
To be sure, there are drawbacks to this proposal. For one, channeling 
election law disputes into prelitigation ADR procedures might lead to 
inaccurate decisions if the parties create an agreement that is inconsistent 
with judicial understanding on an issue.156 In any event, ADR could be 
ineffective if the controversy requires the resolution or interpretation of a 
legal rule or statute.157 ADR also might embellish inequality between parties, 
leading to less just results.158 Moreover, without a legal opinion resolving a 
                                                                                                                                         
152 See Richard Mauer, Miller Ends Challenge in US Senate Race, ANCHORAGE 
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 1, 2011, available at http://www.adn.com/2010/12/31/1626654/miller-
ends-challenge-in-senate.html.
153 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876.
154 See id. at 887–88.
155 See id. at 932–38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156 See Edward Bruneta, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution,
62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 41–42 (1987).
157 Vance K. Opperman, The Pros and Cons of ADR, Including ADR/Litigation 
Hybrids, 1 SEDONA CONF. J. 79, 85 (2000).
158 Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative 
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case, future parties will not have precedents to rely upon in a subsequent 
election.159 Judicial opinions help to make the rules of the game clearer.160 If 
parties use ADR to resolve disputes, then courts will not have this 
opportunity, which is particularly troubling given that the public needs clear 
rules for administering free and fair elections.161 Finally, from a practical 
perspective, it may be unrealistic to expect candidates and campaigns to 
predict which issues need resolution before an election season is underway. 
These concerns may be reasons not to adopt ADR carte blanche for 
election law cases. But I am not arguing for a wholesale application of ADR 
procedures to election law. Instead, my proposal is that ADR concepts can 
help to reduce the amount of negative rhetoric in election law decisions both 
by channeling cases away from the judiciary and by encouraging a 
cooperative spirit among the litigants if the cases do reach court (which, 
hopefully, judges will follow in their written opinions). To that end, the ADR 
strategies outlined above seem imminently suited to achieve this goal. When 
parties engage in voluntary agreements through negotiated rulemaking, they 
are by definition collaborating to maximize everyone’s interest. In doing so, 
they are also likely to ratchet down negative rhetoric. The closer the 
procedure focuses the parties on working together, the more probable their 
discourse will remain civil. By contrast, arbitration, the ADR procedure that 
most resembles litigation, is the least likely option to improve political 
discourse because of its resemblance to litigation.162 Parties to arbitration 
must present their case to a panel, and there is a clear winner and loser.163 As 
explained above, however, when parties become litigious in the context of a 
political debate, everyone’s language becomes more pointed.164 Thus, if one 
of the goals of a resolution system is to improve civic discourse, then we 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
exploits inequality of bargaining power, and ultimately fails to provide adequate remedies 
for weaker parties such as women, minorities, and those with less economic power.”).
159 See Estlund, supra note 140, at 420.
160 See Robert J. Martineau, Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Judicial 
Opinions: A Reassessment, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 119, 128 (1994) (“Written law . . . 
allows for a check of the government and gives the citizens a method to review the 
government’s application of the law.”).
161 Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 102 (2009).
162 See Garth, supra note 86, at 1 (explaining that arbitration is similar to 
“adversarial” litigation).
163 See Oliver J. Armas, Setting the Stage for Successful International ADR, Best 
Practices for International Alternative Dispute Resolution: Leading Lawyers on 
Understanding ADR Laws and Policies, Overcoming Challenges, and Succeeding in a 
Global Setting, 2007 WL 6082207 (2007). 
164 See supra Part I.
ELECTION LAW AND CIVIL DISCOURSE 
319
should focus on those ADR processes that enable the parties to work together 
as much as possible. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Judicial decisions are not the cause of our polarized society and highly 
partisan discourse, but they do not help either. Although channeling more 
disputes to ADR-type processes will not completely eliminate partisan 
rhetoric, it can certainly assist. If courts entertain fewer election law cases 
because the parties work out their differences through alternative means, then 
there is less ability for the structural processes of litigation to create 
polarizing decisions with language that inflames the issues. Using techniques 
underlying ADR in election law can lead to more positive language (or at 
least less negative language) in the resulting decisions, which will have a 
corollary effect on how the media reports these controversies. This ultimately 
will improve our overall political discourse. Thus, when considering new 
procedures for resolving election law disputes, we should include as an 
overarching goal a process that will help to improve (or at least will not 
further derogate) the type of language parties and decisionmakers use. 
Incorporating concepts such as voluntary agreements, negotiated settlement, 
and even arbitration into election law disputes is one way to achieve this end. 
